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Abstract
The short-run increase in prices following an unexpected tightening of monetary policy
represents a frequently reported puzzle. Yet the puzzle is surprisingly easy to explain
away when all published models are quantitatively reviewed. We collect about 1,000
point estimates of impulse responses from 70 articles using vector autoregressive models
and present a simple method of research synthesis for graphical results. We ﬁnd some
evidence of publication selection against the price puzzle. Our results suggest that the
reported impulse responses depend systematically on the study design: when misspeci-
ﬁcations are ﬁltered out, the average impulse response shows that prices decrease soon
after a tightening. The long-run response of prices to monetary policy shocks depends on
the characteristics of the economy.
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Nontechnical Summary
One of the major peculiarities of vector autoregressions, the dominant framework for the em-
pirical analysis of monetary policy, is the counterintuitive rise in prices often reported in these
models to follow a monetary contraction. The so-called price puzzle is encountered by about a
half of all empirical studies, and in many of them the puzzle is even statistically signiﬁcant. In
this paper we collect 70 published studies using vector autoregressions to examine the effects
of monetary policy. Employing meta-regression analysis, a quantitative method of research
synthesis, we investigate which aspects of methodology systematically contribute to reporting
the price puzzle. The meta-regression analysis also shows how the characteristics of the coun-
tries examined inﬂuence the reported shape of the impulse responses and thus help explain the
cross-country heterogeneity in monetary transmission.
We evaluate the reported graphs of impulse responses at ﬁve time horizons (representing the
short, medium, and long run) and for each horizon extract the numerical value of the impulse
response. In this way we collect more than 1,000 estimates, 210 on average for each horizon;
the estimates summarize evidence from 31 countries and were produced by 103 researchers. We
present a method of research synthesis suitable for graphical results such as impulse responses
and employ modern meta-analysis methods to examine the extent of publication selection bias
(the preference of authors, editors, or referees for some particular results based on signiﬁcance
or consistency with theory).
Our results indicate some evidence of publication selection against the price puzzle, and the se-
lection seems to strengthen for responses with longer horizons after monetary tightening. The
ﬁnding is in line with Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008), who suggest that publication selection
is likely to be stronger for research areas with less theory competition. In macroeconomics,
agreement exists about the effects of monetary policy on prices in the long run: prices should
eventually decrease after a contraction. On the other hand, a smaller consensus arises regarding
the exact effects of monetary policy in the short run because of the uncertainty caused by trans-
mission lags. Published results often exhibit the price puzzle for the short run; on the contrary,
results showing the price puzzle for the long run would be difﬁcult to publish.
Thereportedimpulseresponsesaresystematicallyaffectedbystudydesignandcountry-speciﬁc
characteristics. Study design is important in particular for the short run: the reported short-run
increase in prices after a tightening is well explained by the effects of commonly questioned
aspects of methodology, such as the omission of commodity prices, the omission of potential
output, or the use of recursive identiﬁcation. When these aspects of methodology are ﬁltered
out, the average impulse-response function inferred from the entire literature becomes hump-
shaped with no evidence of the price puzzle. Based on such “best-practice” impulse response
the maximum decrease in prices following a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate
is 0.33% and occurs already half a year after the tightening.
Our results suggest that heterogeneity between countries is important for the long-run response
of prices to monetary policy action. Structural characteristics such as GDP growth, average
inﬂation, and openness, as wellas institutionalcharacteristics suchas ﬁnancialdevelopment and
central bank independence, determine the strength of transmission. Finally, using our deﬁnition
of best practice and the estimated relationships between country-level variables and the strength
of monetary transmission, we compute the impulse response implied for the Czech Republic.How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 3
1. Introduction
How does monetary policy affect the price level? This fundamental question of monetary eco-
nomics still ranks among the most controversial when it comes to empirical evidence. Although
intuition and stylized macro models suggest that prices should decrease following a surprise in-
crease in interest rates, empirical ﬁndings often challenge the theory. About 50% of modern
studies using vector autoregressions (VARs) to investigate the effects of monetary policy report
that after a tightening prices actually increase, at least in the short run. Beginning with Sims
(1992), many different solutions to the “price puzzle” have been proposed, varying from alleged
misspeciﬁcations of VARs (Bernanke et al., 2005) to theoretical models that try to justify the
observed rise in prices (Rabanal, 2007).
Depending on the point of view, the price puzzle casts serious doubts either on the ability of
VAR models to correctly identify monetary policy shocks, or on the ability of central banks to
control inﬂation in the short run, or both. Since macroeconomists have produced a plethora
of empirical research on the topic, it seems natural to ask what general effect the literature
implies. The method designed to answer such questions is meta-analysis, a quantitative method
of research synthesis commonly used in economics (Smith and Huang, 1995; Stanley, 2001;
Disdier and Head, 2008; Card et al., 2010), which can provide a unifying framework for this
stream of literature. In contrast to narrative literature surveys, meta-analysis takes into account
possible publication selection, the preference of authors, editors, or referees for results that are
statistically signiﬁcant or consistent with the theory, a bias that has become a great concern
in empirical economic research (Card and Krueger, 1995; Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004;
Stanley, 2008).
Meta-analysis enables researchers to examine the systematic dependencies of reported results
on study design and to separate the wheat from the chaff by ﬁltering out the effects of mis-
speciﬁcations. Meta-analysis can create a synthetic study with ideal parameters, such as the
maximum breadth of data or a consensus best-practice methodology, and, in our case, estimates
the underlying effect of monetary policy corrected for potential misspeciﬁcation and publica-
tion biases. Furthermore, meta-analysis makes it possible to investigate how the strength of
monetary transmission depends on the characteristics of the countries examined. In this pa-
per we attempt to collect all published studies examining monetary transmission within a VAR
framework and extract point estimates of impulse responses together with the corresponding
conﬁdence bounds. We investigate the degree of publication selection, the role of model mis-
speciﬁcation for the occurrence of the price puzzle, and the factors underlying the heterogeneity
of price responses to monetary shocks across countries and over time.
Based on the mixed-effects multilevel model we illustrate how meta-analysis is able to disentan-
gle various factors causing researchers to encounter the price puzzle. We show that when best
practice is followed, the researcher is likely to ﬁnd that prices decrease signiﬁcantly soon after
a monetary tightening. Our results thus suggest that the puzzle stems from model misspeciﬁ-
cation rather than from the real behavior of prices. In addition, the results indicate publication
selection in favor of the negative responses of prices to a monetary contraction. Finally, the
analysis of the determinants of transmission heterogeneity suggests that monetary policy has a
stronger effect on prices in more open economies, in countries with a more independent central
bank, and during economic downturns.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 describes how we collected
the estimates from VAR models. Section 3 reviews the suggested solutions to the price puzzle.4 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
Section4testsforpublicationselectionbiasandfortheunderlyingeffectofmonetarytightening
on prices. Section 5 models method and structural heterogeneity among impulse responses.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides additional robustness checks, and Appendix B lists
all the studies used to construct the data set.
2. The Impulse Responses Data Set
Ever since the seminal contribution of Sims (1980), VARs have been the dominant tool for in-
vestigating monetary transmission. Researchers using VARs to examine the impact of monetary
policy usually assume that the economy can be described by the following dynamic model:
AYt = B(L)Yt 1 + "t; (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables typically containing a measure of output, prices,
interest rates, and, in the case of a small open economy, the exchange rate. Matrix A describes
contemporaneous relationships between endogenous variables, B(L) is a matrix lag polyno-
mial, and "t is a vector of structural shocks with the variance-covariance matrix E("t"0
t) = I.
The system is called the structural-form VAR. In order to estimate it, researchers rewrite the
system to its reduced form:
Yt = C(L)Yt 1 + ut; (2)
where the elements of matrix C(L) are the convolutions of the elements of matrices A and B,
and ut is a vector of reduced-form shocks with the variance-covariance matrix E(utu0
t) = ; the
relationship between structural shocks and reduced-form residuals is "t = Aut. The dynamic
responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks can be studied by impulse-response
functions.
Figure 1 presents two stylized types of the price level’s impulse responses to a monetary tight-
ening. The left panel demonstrates the price puzzle: prices increase signiﬁcantly in the short
run, while in contrast, the right panel shows a response which corresponds with the mainstream
prior: the price level declines soon after a tightening.
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The ﬁrst step of meta-analysis is to select the studies to be included. While some meta-analysts
use both published and unpublished studies, others conﬁne their sample to journal articles (for
instance, Abreu et al., 2005). Including working papers and mimeographs in meta-analysis
does not help alleviate publication bias: if journals systematically prefer certain results, rational
authors will already adopt the same preference in the earlier stages of research as they prepare
for journal submission. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests no difference in the magnitude of
publication bias between published and unpublished studies (see the meta-analysis of 65 meta-
analyses by Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2008). And even if there was a difference, modern meta-
regression methods not only identify but also ﬁlter out the bias. Therefore, as a preliminary and
simple criterion of quality, we only consider articles published in peer-reviewed journals or in
handbooks (such as the Handbook of Macroeconomics).
The following literature search strategy was employed. First, we examined two literature sur-
veys (Stock and Watson, 2001; Egert and MacDonald, 2009) and set up a search query able to
capture most of the relevant studies; we searched both the EconLit and RePEc databases. Next,
wecheckedthereferencesofstudiespublishedin2010andthecitationsofthemostwidelycited
study in the VAR literature, Christiano et al. (1999). After going through the abstracts of all
identiﬁed studies, we selected 195 that showed any promise of containing empirical estimates
of impulse responses and examined them in detail. The search was terminated on September
15, 2010.
To be able to use meta-analysis methods fully, we exclude the studies that omit to report conﬁ-
dence intervals around impulse responses. Unfortunately, we thus have to exclude some seminal
articles such as Sims (1992) or a few recent studies that estimate time-varying-parameter VARs.
To obtain a more homogeneous sample we focus only on studies that deﬁne a monetary policy
shock as a shock in the interest rate. A number of studies investigate the change in the mon-
etary base; since Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), however, the majority of the
literature investigates interest rate shocks because most central banks now use the interest rate
as their main policy instrument. We only include studies examining the response of the price
level; a minority of studies examine the responses of the inﬂation rate.
These incorporation criteria leave 70 studies in our database. The full list of studies included
in the data set can be found in Appendix B, and the list of excluded studies is presented in the
online appendix at meta-analysis.cz/price puzzle.
Considering the richness and heterogeneity of the empirical evidence on the effects of monetary
policy, it is surprising there has been no quantitative synthesis using modern meta-regression
methods.1 One reason is that the results are typically presented in the form of graphs instead
of numerical values, and the graphs contain estimates for many time horizons following the
monetary policy shock. Researchers usually investigate up to 36- or 48-month horizons when
using monthly data and up to 20 quarters when using quarterly data; it is unclear which horizon
should be chosen to summarize the effect.
1 To our knowledge, there has been one unpublished meta-analysis on the impact of monetary policy on prices
(de Grauwe and Storti, 2004) and one on the impact on economic activity (Ridhwan et al., 2010). They focus
solely on heterogeneity in the reported estimates. Our paper differs from de Grauwe and Storti (2004) in three main
aspects. First, in addition to point estimates of the impulse responses we extract their precision, which allows us to
test for publication bias and to estimate the underlying effect beyond. Next, we restrict the sample to VAR studies,
gather more of them (70 compared to 43), examine more time horizons after a monetary policy shock (5 compared
to 2), use four times more point estimates, and codify three times more variables that explain heterogeneity. Finally,
employing multilevel meta-analysis methods we account for possible within-study dependence and construct a
synthetic ideal study to ﬁlter out misspeciﬁcation bias and explain the price puzzle.6 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
Our meta-analysis is designed in the following way. We extract responses at 3- and 6-month
horizons to capture the short-run effect, at 12- and 18-month horizons to capture the medium-
run effect, and at the 36-month horizon to capture the long-run effect.
We enlarge the graphs of impulse responses and using pixel coordinates we measure the re-
sponse and its conﬁdence bounds. The graphs of all impulse responses as well as the extracted
values are available in the online appendix. The resulting measurement error is random, similar
to the rounding error in numerical outcomes, and thus inevitable in a meta-analysis.
The extracted values must be transformed into a common metric to ensure that the estimates
are comparable. To standardize the estimates to represent the effect of a one-percentage-point
increase in the interest rate, we divide the responses by the magnitude of the monetary pol-
icy shock used in the study.2 In the case of factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) studies, where
the responses are usually given in standard-deviation units, we normalize the responses by the
standard deviation of the particular time series.
Since the conﬁdence intervals around the impulse response estimates are often asymmetrical
(conﬁdence intervals are usually bootstrapped; Sims and Zha, 1999), the standard errors of
the estimates cannot be obtained directly. In this case we approximate the standard error by
the distance from the point estimate to the conﬁdence bound closer to zero; that is, we take the
lower conﬁdence bound for positive responses and the upper bound for negative responses. This
bound determines signiﬁcance and would be associated with potential publication selection.
Should we use the average of the distance to both conﬁdence bounds, the inference would
remain similar; these additional results are available in the online appendix. When the reported
conﬁdence interval is presented in standard-deviation units (for example, +/  two standard
deviations), we can immediately approximate the standard error. Otherwise, we proceed as if
the estimates were symmetrically distributed and assume that, for example, the 68% conﬁdence
interval represents an interval of one standard error around the mean.
Following the recent trend in meta-analysis (Disdier and Head, 2008; Doucouliagos and Stan-
ley, 2009), we use all reported estimates from the 70 primary studies. Arbitrarily selecting
the “best” estimate or using the average reported estimate would discard a great deal of useful
information about the differences in methods within one study. We do not clean the data set:
rather, for all regressions we evaluate the stability of coefﬁcients employing the random sam-
ple method, which replicates the regression 1,000 times with a subset of 80% of the original
data set. This sensitivity analysis, presented in the online appendix, indicates that our results
are robust to outliers. In addition the method of meta-analysis includes a built-in robustness
check—for instance the current version of the manuscript covers 10% more studies than the
ﬁrst draft, yet the results remain qualitatively identical.
Thenumberofimpulseresponsescollectedforeachofthehorizonsisapproximately210, which
in total amounts to more than 1,000 point estimates. More speciﬁcally, we collect 208 estimates
for the 3-month horizon, 215 for the 6- and 12-month horizons, 217 for the 18-month horizon,
and 205 for the 36-month horizon. For comparison, consider Nelson and Kennedy (2009), who
review 140 economic meta-analyses and report that the median analysis uses 92 point estimates
from 33 primary studies. The oldest study in our sample was published in 1992 and the median
study was published in 2006, the data set covers evidence from 31 countries, and we build upon
the work of 103 researchers. The median time span of the data used by the primary studies is
2 When we were uncertain about the magnitude of shock used in the primary study, we contacted the authors.How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 7
1980–2002. All studies in the sample combined receive approximately 800 citations in Google
Scholar per year, indicating the inﬂuence of VARs in monetary economics.
3. Collecting the Pieces of the Puzzle
To motivate the selection of explanatory variables in the multivariate meta-regression analysis
(Section 5), we now brieﬂy review the solutions to the price puzzle that have been proposed in
the literature. Most of these remedies have proven to alleviate the puzzle in some cases; none
of them, though, has been fully successful in solving it. Table 1 demonstrates that from the 208
estimates collected for the 3-month horizon, exactly a half exhibit the price puzzle, and in 15%
of the estimates the puzzle is even statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The table summarizes
the effectiveness of the different solutions to the puzzle. Even in the case of the most effective
solution, 24% of speciﬁcations still exhibit the puzzle (except for sign restrictions, which in
some cases, however, represent a tautological solution).
Table 1: Effectiveness of the Suggested Solutions to the Price Puzzle
Methodology used in the estimation
All Commodity Trend/Gap Single FAVAR SVAR Sign
Responses estimated 208 125 33 64 11 60 31
Price puzzle present 104 61 8 24 8 20 3
Price puzzle signiﬁcant 32 16 1 5 3 6 0
Note: Commodity = Commodity prices are included in the VAR, Trend/Gap = time trend or output gap is included, Single = the VAR
is estimated on the sample containing a single monetary policy regime, FAVAR = a factor-augmented VAR is estimated, SVAR = non-
recursive identiﬁcation is used, Sign = shocks are identiﬁed by imposing sign restrictions, not necessarily on prices.
3.1 Omitted Variables
Commodity Prices According to Sims (1992) the price puzzle occurs because central banks
are forward-looking and react to the anticipated future movements of inﬂation by raising the
interestrate. WhenaVARsystemomitsinformationaboutfutureinﬂation, theexaminedshocks
become the combinations of true monetary policy shocks and endogenous reactions to expected
inﬂation. If the central bank does not fully accommodate the expected inﬂation, the data might
show that an increase in the interest rate, mistakenly recognized as a monetary policy shock, is
followed by an increase in the price level. Sims (1992) ﬁnds that including commodity prices
into the VAR mitigates the price puzzle. Nevertheless, as follows from Table 1, the inclusion of
commodity prices does not solve the puzzle automatically—in fact, it seems to help little.
Output Gap Giordani (2004) argues that the use of GDP in the VAR system without con-
trolling for the potential of the economy can bias the estimates and cause the price puzzle. He
claims that commodity prices alleviate the puzzle mostly because they contain useful informa-
tion about the output gap, not just because they are a good predictor of future inﬂation. In a
similar vein, Hanson (2004) examines a battery of other indicators and ﬁnds little correlation
between the ability to solve the price puzzle and the ability to forecast inﬂation. Approximately
16% of speciﬁcations in our sample use the output gap (or add a time trend), but some of them
still encounter the puzzle.
Factor-augmented VAR To address the major shortcomings of standard small-scale VARs,
Bernanke et al. (2005) introduce the factor-augmented VAR approach. They argue that, in8 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
practice, policymakers take into account hundreds of variables when deciding about mone-
tary policy. Standard VAR models with typically three to six variables may therefore suffer
from omitted-variable bias; the FAVAR approach, on the other hand, makes use of additional
information by extracting principal components from many time series. Nonetheless, simple
summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that FAVAR is not particularly effective in explaining the
puzzle away.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
While some researchers stress the role of omitted variables, others argue that the puzzle arises
from implausible identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks. The usual recursive identiﬁcation,
which assumes that monetary policy affects output and prices only with a lag, is, for example,
not consistent with the New-Keynesian class of theoretical models (Carlstrom et al., 2009).3
Non-recursive Identiﬁcation Kim (1999) and Kim and Roubini (2000) introduced and ap-
plied a non-recursive method for the identiﬁcation of shocks. The main idea, going back to
Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Watson (1986), says that the matrix contemporaneously
linking structural shocks and reduced-form residuals is no longer lower triangular, but that it
assumes a general form indicated by theory: the rows of the matrix have a structural interpre-
tation. The restrictions presented by Kim and Roubini (2000) are elicited from the structural
stochastic equilibrium model developed by Sims and Zha (1998).
Alternatively, researchers may impose a long-run restriction in order to identify monetary policy
shocks; this approach is pursued by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Clarida and Gali (1994),
who only allow technological shocks to have a permanent effect on economic activity. Re-
cently Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) combine short-run and long-run restrictions. Although
non-recursive identiﬁcation is appealing, in almost 33% of the responses computed using this
strategy the price puzzle still occurs.
Sign Restrictions Faust (1998), Canova and Nicolo (2002), and Uhlig (2005) present a novel
identiﬁcationapproachthatassignsstructuralinterpretationtoorthogonalinnovationsbyimpos-
ing sign restriction on the responses to shocks. The method is attractive since sign restrictions
can be derived from the canonical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The
use of sign restrictions in VARs has recently been criticized by Fry and Pagan (2010): because
impulse responses do not come from a common model, the shocks may not be orthogonal. Fry
and Pagan (2010) argue that sign restrictions need not generate better quantitative estimates than
recursive methods. Nevertheless, as Table 1 documents, VARs estimated with sign restrictions
rarely encounter the price puzzle.
3.3 Monetary Policy Regime
Another stream of literature suggests that the puzzle is historically limited to periods of passive
monetary policy4 or that it emerges when the data mix different monetary regimes (Elbourne
and de Haan, 2006; Borys et al., 2009). For example, if a researcher assumes that the central
3 Romer and Romer (2004) point out that the traditional indicators (money supply and interest rates) contain antic-
ipatory movements that might contaminate estimated monetary policy shocks. By using quantitative and narrative
records from the Federal Open Market Committee meetings they produce a measure of monetary policy shocks
based on changes in the intended federal funds rate and the Fed’s expectations on future inﬂation and output.
4 Monetary policy is considered passive when it violates the so-called Taylor principle. The Taylor principle
requires the central bank to sufﬁciently increase the interest rate after a positive shock to inﬂation expectations, so
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bank uses the interest rate to target inﬂation, although for some part of the sample monetary
or exchange rate targeting was in place, monetary policy shocks in the VAR system become
incorrectly identiﬁed.
Hanson (2004) shows that neither commodity prices nor other indicators are able to solve the
price puzzle in the 1959–1979 period, suggesting that the puzzle is associated with that period.
Similar results are reported by Castelnuovo and Surico (2010), who ﬁnd the price puzzle in the
pre-1979sampleevenaftercontrollingfortheoutputgap. Thisﬁndinghasbeenreportedmainly
for the United States, but Benati (2008) presents similar evidence for the United Kingdom.
3.4 Cost Channel
A decrease in the price level following a tightening of monetary policy is predicted by stylized
theoretical models stressing the importance of the demand channel of transmission. On the
other hand, Barth and Ramey (2002) emphasize the supply-side effects and present evidence
for the so-called cost channel. Since ﬁrms depend on credit to ﬁnance production, their costs
rise when the central bank increases the interest rate, and they may increase prices. In this view
the price puzzle does not stem from methodological problems in VARs, but represents a genuine
response to monetary tightening when the cost channel dominates the demand channel.
For the United States, Christiano et al. (2005) build a DSGE model incorporating the cost
channel, but only ﬁnd a minor role for it. In a similar vein the results of Rabanal (2007) suggest
that the demand-side effects of monetary policy dominate the supply-side effects, thus leaving
the cost channel relatively unimportant. Henzel et al. (2009) come to similar conclusions for
the euro area.
4. Consequences of Publication Selection
After we have collected about 1,000 estimates of the response of prices to monetary tightening,
a natural question arises: what general impulse response does the literature suggest? Meta-
analysis was originally developed in medicine to combine many small studies into a large one,
and therefore to boost the number of degrees of freedom. Clinical trials are costly, and meta-
analysis thus became the dominant method of taking stock of medical research. Estimating a
VAR model may be less expensive, but the degrees of freedom in macroeconomics are limited.
Hence, the original purpose of meta-analysis is useful even here since it combines information
from many countries and time periods: when recomputed into quarters the primary studies in
our sample taken together use 2,452 unique observations.
Taking a simple mean of all point estimates for each of the ﬁve horizons implies the impulse-
response function depicted in Figure 2. This average impulse response shows a relatively intu-
itive short-run reaction of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate: prices
decline already in the short run, the decrease becomes signiﬁcant in the medium run and reaches
0.56% after 36 months. The response surprisingly shows no sign of bottoming out. This is in-
consistent with what central banks typically assume about the nature of monetary policy trans-
mission. Central banks typically claim that the maximum impact of monetary policy shocks on
prices occurs between one and two years after the shock (see Bank of England, 1999; European
Central Bank, 2010).10 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
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Note: Confidence bands are constructed as +/- one standard error.
Simply averaging the collected impulse responses has two major shortcomings. First, it ignores
possible publication selection. If some results are more likely to get published than others, the
average becomes a biased estimator of the underlying impulse response. Second, it ignores
heterogeneity in the results of the primary studies. Since different researchers use different data
and methods, and the studies are of different quality, it is unrealistic to assume that all estimates
are drawn from the same population. In addition, as discussed in Section 3, some VAR models
are misspeciﬁed, and if misspeciﬁcations have a systematic inﬂuence on the results, it may be
possibletoimproveupontheaverageresponsebyﬁlteringoutthemisspeciﬁcations. Weaddress
publication selection in this section and heterogeneity and misspeciﬁcation issues in Section 5.
Stanley (2008), among others, points out that publication selection is of major concern for
empirical research in economics. When there is little theory competition for what sign the un-
derlying effect should have, estimates inconsistent with the predominant theory will be treated
with suspicion or even be discarded. An illustrative example can be found in the literature on
the effect of a common currency on trade (Rose and Stanley, 2005): it is hard to defend nega-
tive estimates of the trade effect of currency unions. The negative estimates most likely result
from misspeciﬁcation, and researchers may be correct in not stressing them. On the other hand,
it is far more difﬁcult to identify excessively large estimates of the same effect that also arise
from misspeciﬁcations. No speciﬁc threshold exists above which the estimate would become
suspicious. If researchers include the large positive estimates but omit the negative ones, the
inference will be on average biased toward a stronger effect.
Similar selection, perhaps of lower intensity, may be taking place in the VAR literature on mon-
etary transmission as well (Uhlig, 2010, p. 17, provides anecdotal evidence). Some researchers
treat the price puzzle as a clear indication of a misspeciﬁcation error and try to ﬁnd an intu-
itive impulse response for interpretation. Statistical signiﬁcance is also important. Signiﬁcant
impulse responses are more convenient for interpretation, and especially researchers in central
banks may be interested in reporting a well-functioning monetary transmission with a signiﬁ-
cant reaction of prices to a change in monetary policy. The selection for signiﬁcance does not
distort the average estimate from the literature if the true underlying effect equals zero, but oth-How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 11
erwise it creates a bias, again in favor of a stronger effect since estimates with the wrong sign
are less likely to be signiﬁcant.
A common way to detect publication selection is an informal examination of a so-called funnel
plot (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010). The funnel plot depicts the estimates on the horizontal
axis against their precision (the inverse of the standard error) on the vertical axis. If there is no
heterogeneity or misspeciﬁcation, the estimates with the highest precision will be close to the
true underlying effect. In the absence of publication selection the funnel is symmetrical: the
reported estimates are dispersed randomly around the true effect. The asymmetry of the funnel
plot suggests publication bias; for example, if estimates with a positive sign are less likely to
be selected for publication, estimates on the right side of the funnel will be underrepresented.
The funnel plots for all ﬁve horizons are depicted in Figure 3.5 The plots resemble funnels
commonly reported in economic meta-analyses, which indicates that the employed approxima-
tion of standard errors is plausible. As expected, the left part of all funnels is clearly heavier,
suggesting publication selection against the price puzzle and in favor of the more negative (that
is, stronger) effects of monetary tightening on prices. Nevertheless, the interpretation of funnel
plots is subjective, and a more formal test of publication bias is required.
Given small samples, authors wishing to obtain signiﬁcant results may be tempted to try differ-
ent speciﬁcations until they ﬁnd estimates large enough to offset the standard errors. In contrast,
with large samples even tiny estimates might be statistically signiﬁcant, and authors therefore
have fewer incentives to conduct a speciﬁcation search. If publication selection is present, we
should observe a relationship between an estimate and its standard error (or the square root of
the number of observations). The following regression formalizes the idea (Card and Krueger,
1995):
^ j =  + 0SEj + ej; (3)
where  denotes the true underlying effect, ^ j denotes the effect’s j-th estimate, 0 denotes the
magnitude of publication bias, SEj denotes the standard error of ^ j, and ej denotes a distur-
bance term.
Speciﬁcation (3) has become the cornerstone of modern meta-analysis in medicine and the so-
cial sciences, including economics. The question is whether the method is suitable for summa-
rizing graphical results such as impulse responses. In order for this meta-analysis method to be
valid, the distribution of empirical effects needs to be symmetrical in the absence of publication
bias (usually it is assumed that the disturbance term in (3) is normally distributed). But impulse
responses are nonlinear functions of the coefﬁcients estimated in the VAR system; as discussed
in Section 2, the conﬁdence intervals around the individual estimates are often asymmetrical. If
the pattern of asymmetry is not random across the individual estimates, the distribution of the
impulse responses will not be symmetrical even in the absence of publication bias, and the test
for publication bias will be invalid.
Systematic asymmetry of the distribution of impulse responses would manifest as a signiﬁcant
difference between the average distance from the point estimate of the impulse response to
the lower and upper conﬁdence bound. We select the 68% conﬁdence bound, which for a
symmetrical distribution would mean a distance of one standard error on both sides of the
5 A few outlying estimates are trimmed from the funnels to ensure that the main pattern is clearly observable.
Nevertheless, all estimates are included in the meta-regression analysis.12 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath





























































































































































































































































































































sHow to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 13
mean. The difference of the distances is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for only one out of ﬁve
horizons (the 12-month horizon), and even there the difference is small: the average lower
conﬁdence interval is 11.6% further from the mean. It is unlikely that such a small difference
could explain the degree of asymmetry apparent from Figure 3. It cannot explain the asymmetry
of the distribution of the collected point estimates of the impulse responses at the 12-month
horizon, where the distance from the 16th to the 50th percentile is 53.1% larger than the distance
from the 50th to the 84th percentile. For this reason, we employ the standard meta-analysis
methodology—bearing in mind that the results concerning publication bias must be interpreted
with some caution.
In practice, meta-analysts rarely estimate speciﬁcation (3) directly since it suffers from het-
eroscedasticity by deﬁnition (the explanatory variable is a sample estimate of the standard de-
viation of the response variable). Instead, weighted least squares are used to gain efﬁciency,









+ j; jjSEj  N(0;
2); (4)
where tj denotes the approximated t-statistic of the estimate, and the new disturbance term
j has constant variance. Note that the intercept and the slope are now reversed: the slope
measures the true effect, and the intercept measures publication bias. In addition to removing
heteroscedasticity, speciﬁcation (4) gives more weight to more precise results, which represents
a common approach in meta-analysis. Testing the signiﬁcance of 0 in this speciﬁcation is
analogous to testing the asymmetry of the funnel plot—it follows from rotating the funnel plot
and dividing the values on the new vertical axis by SEj. Testing the signiﬁcance of  constitutes
a test for the true underlying effect of monetary tightening on prices, corrected for publication
selection.
Since we use all reported impulse responses we need to account for the potential dependence of
estimates within one study (Disdier and Head, 2008); in such case, (4) would be misspeciﬁed.
As a remedy, researchers typically employ the mixed-effects multilevel model (Doucouliagos
and Stanley, 2009):





+ j + ij; jjSEij  N(0; ); ijjSEij;j  N(0;); (5)
where i and j denote estimate and study subscripts. The overall error term now consists of
study-level random effects and estimate-level disturbances (ij = j + ij), and its variance is
additive since both components are assumed to be independent: Var(ij) =   + , where  
denotes between-study variance and  within-study variance. If   approaches zero the beneﬁt
of using the mixed-effect estimator instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) dwindles. To put
the magnitude of these variance terms into perspective the within-study correlation is useful:
  Cor(ij;i0j) =  =( +), which expresses the degree of dependence of estimates reported
in the same study, or equivalently, the degree of between-study heterogeneity.
The mixed-effects multilevel model is analogous to the random-effects model commonly used
in panel-data econometrics. We follow the terminology from multilevel data modeling, which
calls the model “mixed effects” since it contains a ﬁxed () as well as a random part (j).
For the purposes of meta-analysis the multilevel framework is more suitable because it takes14 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
into account the unbalancedness of the data (the restricted maximum likelihood estimator is
used instead of generalized least squares), allows for nesting multiple random effects (study-,
author-, or country-level), and is thus more ﬂexible (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009).
Table 2: Test of True Effect and Publication Bias
Mixed-effects multilevel
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months




(0.167) (0.166) (0.145) (0.128) (0.126)
1/SE (effect) 0.009 0.007 -0.014 -0.019 -0.009
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
Within-study correlation 0.43 0.56 0.46 0.41 0.14
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of the estimate of the percentage response of prices to






denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The outcomes of the mixed-effects estimator are presented in Table 2. OLS with standard errors
clustered at the study level are reported in the Appendix: Table A1 gives even more signiﬁcant
results for publication bias. The within-study correlation is large, indicating that the mixed-
effects estimator is more appropriate, which is conﬁrmed by likelihood-ratio tests. We also
experimented with several nested mixed-effects models (available in the online appendix), but
they yield qualitatively similar outcomes. Compared with the simple average, the response of
prices corrected for publication bias is more positive (that is, weaker), corroborating evidence
for publication selection in favor of the stronger responses of prices to monetary policy con-
traction. Moreover, the magnitude of publication bias increases with the time horizon after the
shock. This result is in line with Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008), who ﬁnd stronger pub-
lication selection for research questions with weaker theory competition. For the short run,
some disagreement occurs regarding the effects of monetary policy on prices because of the
cost channel. On the other hand, a consensus emerges about the long-run effect: prices should
eventually decrease after monetary policy tightening; estimates showing the opposite would be
difﬁcult to publish.
The impulse-response function corrected for publication bias is depicted in Figure 4: it exhibits
the price puzzle. In the short run prices increase, but in the medium run they decrease and
bottom out 18 months after the tightening. The maximum decrease in the price level, however,
is negligible: only 0.02%. Compared to the average response reported in Figure 2, now the
function shifts upwards—especially in the long run, because publication bias is ﬁltered out.
Figure 4 would be our best estimate of the underlying impulse response if all heterogeneity
betweenstudieswasrandom; theestimateisunconditionalonthecharacteristicsofthecountries
examined and on the methodology used. In the next section we relax the assumption of random
heterogeneity and explain the differences in the reported estimates.
5. What Explains Heterogeneity
As motivation for the empirical investigation of structural heterogeneity consider Figure 5,
which depicts the differences in monetary transmission among selected countries. We use aHow to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 15
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Note: Confidence bands are constructed as +/- one standard error.
simple random-effects meta-analysis to compute impulse-response functions. Simple meta-
analysis weights each estimate by its precision and adds an estimate-speciﬁc random effect; it
does not correct for publication bias. We use simple meta-analysis for estimation by countries
since it requires fewer degrees of freedom than meta-regression. Figure 5 shows that the im-
pulse responses for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan exhibit the price puzzle,
but that monetary transmission in euro area countries seems to work intuitively and prices de-
cline soon after a tightening. Nevertheless, a part of these differences may arise from the use of
diverse methods since some countries are examined only in a few studies.
To account for heterogeneity we extend the meta-regression (5) to the following multivariate
version:








+ j + ij; (6)
whereZ denotesexplanatoryvariablesassumedtoaffectthereportedestimates. Theexogeneity
assumptions become jjSEij;Zijk  N(0; ) and ijjSEij;j;Zijk  N(0;).
Table 3 presents descriptions and summary statistics of all the explanatory variables we con-
sider. In principle, they can be divided into ﬁve groups: variables capturing the fundamental
characteristics of the economy (structural heterogeneity), data characteristics control for differ-
ences in the data used, speciﬁcation characteristics control for differences in the basic design
of the estimated models, estimation characteristics control for differences in econometric tech-
niques, and publication characteristics controlmainly for differences in quality not captured by
other variables.16 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
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Table 3: Description and Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Response (3M) The percentage response of prices 3 months after a tightening. -0.034 0.692
Response (6M) The percentage response of prices 6 months after a tightening. -0.067 0.883
Response (12M) The percentage response of prices 12 months after a tightening. -0.136 1.012
Response (18M) The percentage response of prices 18 months after a tightening. -0.216 1.327
Response (36M) The percentage response of prices 36 months after a tightening. -0.561 1.714
1=SE The precision of the estimate of the response (all horizons). 6.805 7.821
Structural heterogeneity
GDP per capita The logarithm of the country’s real GDP per capita. 9.881 0.414
GDP growth The average growth rate of the country’s real GDP. 2.668 1.035
Inﬂation The average inﬂation of the country. 7.748 14.26





The ﬁnancial development of the country measured by (domestic
credit to private sector)/GDP.
0.837 0.414
Continued on next pageHow to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 17
Table 3: Description and Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (continued)
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Openness The trade openness of the country measured by (exports + im-
ports)/GDP.
0.460 0.401
CB independence A measure of central bank independence (Arnone et al., 2009). 0.774 0.143
Data characteristics
Monthly =1 if monthly data are used. 0.630 0.483
Time span The number of years of the data used in the estimation. 18.83 10.44
No. of observations The logarithm of the number of observations used. 4.889 0.675
Average year The average year of the data used (2000 as a base). -8.926 7.881
Speciﬁcation characteristics
GDP deﬂator =1 if the GDP deﬂator is used instead of the consumer price index
as a measure of prices.
0.177 0.382
Single regime =1 if the VAR is estimated over a period of a single monetary
policy regime.
0.296 0.457
No. of lags The number of lags in the model, normalized by frequency:
lags/frequency
0.610 0.370
Commodity prices =1 if a commodity price index is included. 0.607 0.489
Money =1 if a monetary aggregate is included. 0.529 0.499
Foreign variables =1 if at least one foreign variable is included. 0.441 0.497
Time trend =1 if a time trend is included. 0.126 0.332
Seasonal =1 if seasonal dummies are included. 0.146 0.354





=1 if industrial production is used as a measure of economic ac-
tivity.
0.430 0.495
Output gap =1 if the output gap is used as a measure of economic activity. 0.028 0.165




BVAR =1 if a Bayesian VAR is estimated. 0.144 0.352
FAVAR =1 if a factor-augmented VAR is estimated. 0.051 0.221
SVAR =1 if non-recursive identiﬁcation is employed. 0.295 0.456
Sign restrictions =1 if sign restrictions are employed. 0.144 0.352
Publication characteristics
Study citations The logarithm of [(Google Scholar citations of the study)/(age of
the study) + 1]. Collected in May 2010.
1.882 1.279
Impact The recursive RePEc impact factor of the outlet. Collected in
May 2010.
0.888 2.274
Central banker =1 if at least one co-author is afﬁliated with a central bank. 0.451 0.498
Policymaker =1ifatleastoneco-authorisafﬁliatedwithaMinistryofFinance,
IMF, OECD, or BIS.
0.055 0.228
Native =1 if at least one co-author is native to the investigated country. 0.446 0.497
Publication year The year of publication (2000 as a base). 5.032 3.886
Structural heterogeneity When constructing the variables that capture structural hetero-
geneity, we use the average values which correspond with the sample employed in the estima-
tion of the impulse response. For instance, in the case of inﬂation: When the impulse response
comes from a VAR model estimated on the 1990:1–1999:12 Italian data, we use the average
inﬂation rate in Italy for the period 1990–1999. This approach increases the variability in
regressors and describes the estimates more precisely than using the same year of structural
variables for all extracted impulse responses. The variable GDP per capita reﬂects the impor-
tance of the degree of economic development of the economy for monetary transmission. To18 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
investigate whether the strength of transmission depends on the phase of the economic cycle,
we include the variable GDP growth in the meta-regression.6 The underlying reason is related
to credit market imperfections, which could amplify the propagation of monetary policy shocks
during bust periods (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Next, we examine the variables implied by
the various channels of the transmission mechanism. We include the trade openness of the
economy to capture the importance of foreign developments for domestic monetary policy as
well as the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission. Furthermore, as pointed out by
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Cecchetti (1999), differences in ﬁnancial structure may ex-
plain important portions of heterogeneity in monetary transmission. We include a measure of
ﬁnancial development approximated by the ratio of private credit to GDP.
We add the average level and volatility of inﬂation, as these may inﬂuence price setting behavior
as well as monetary transmission (Angeloni et al., 2006). We expect that independent central
banks are likely to have more credibility (Rogoff, 1985; Keefer and Stasavage, 2003; Perino,
2010). In consequence, economic subjects may respond more to monetary policy shocks. We
test whether the degree of central bank independence affects the strength of monetary transmis-
sion.
Regarding the sources of the data: trade openness, GDP growth, and GDP level per capita are
obtained from Penn World Tables. The consumer price index, used to compute average inﬂation
and inﬂation volatility, is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Finan-
cial Statistics. The ratio of domestic credit to GDP is obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, and the index of central bank independence is extracted from Arnone
et al. (2009).
Datacharacteristics WecontrolforthefrequencyofthedatausedintheVARmodel: 63%of
speciﬁcations use monthly data, the rest rely on quarterly data. To account for possible changes
in transmission not explained by the structural variables (for example, changes caused by glob-
alization or ﬁnancial innovations, Boivin and Giannoni, 2006), we include the average year of
the sample period used in the estimation. Finally, we add the total number of observations to
assess whether smaller samples yield systematically different outcomes.
Speciﬁcation characteristics To account for the different measures of the price level we
include a dummy which equals one when the GDP deﬂator is used instead of the usual consumer
price index (18% of speciﬁcations in primary studies). We add a dummy for the case where the
data cover a period of a single monetary policy regime (30%). Next, we include the VAR’s lag
order normalized by the data frequency. We account for the cases where commodity prices,
a money aggregate, foreign variables, a time trend, and seasonal dummies are included in the
VAR. We also control for the number of endogenous variables in the model. Since the results
might vary depending on the measure of economic activity, we introduce dummies for the cases
where industrial production, the output gap, or another measure is used instead of GDP.
Estimation characteristics Most of the studies in our sample estimate VAR models using the
standard methods (OLS or Maximum Likelihood); we control for studies using Bayesian meth-
ods to address the problem of overparameterization (14% of speciﬁcations in primary studies)
and for studies using the FAVAR approach to address the problem of omitted variables (5%).
As for identiﬁcation strategies, most of the studies employ recursive identiﬁcation; we include
6 Ideally the output gap, if measured accurately, should be used. Unfortunately we have many countries in our
sample, and, to our knowledge, there are no output gap estimates that use the same methodology for all countries.
Nevertheless, most countries in our sample are advanced and typically share similar growth rates of potential GDP.How to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 19
a dummy for non-recursive identiﬁcation (30%) and a dummy for identiﬁcation using sign re-
strictions (14%).
Publicationcharacteristics To proxystudy qualitywe usethe recursiveRePEc impactfactor
of the outlet (as the journal coverage of RePEc is much more comprehensive than in other
databases) and the number of Google Scholar citations of the study normalized by the study’s
age. We add a dummy for authors afﬁliated with a central bank and a dummy for authors
workingatpolicy-orientedinstitutionssuchasaMinistryofFinance, theInternationalMonetary
Fund, or the Bank for International Settlements. We include a dummy for the case where at least
one co-author is “native” to the examined country: such authors may be more familiar with the
data at hand, which could contribute positively to the quality of the analysis; on the other hand,
such authors may have a vested interest in the results. We consider authors native if they either
were born in the country or obtained an academic degree there. Finally, we use the year of
publication to account for possible improvements in methodology that are otherwise difﬁcult to
codify.
In the ﬁrst step we estimate a general model containing all explanatory variables; the general
model is not reported but is available in the online appendix. All variance inﬂation factors are
lowerthan10, indicatingthatthedegreeofmulticolinearityisnottooproblematic. Inthesecond
step, we drop the variables which are, for each horizon, jointly insigniﬁcant at the 10% level.
For example, GDP per capita, the number of lags used, and most publication characteristics
belong to the dropped variables. The insigniﬁcance of publication characteristics suggests that
the quality of a given study is to a large extent captured by the methods used.
The resulting, more parsimonious, model is presented in Table 4. The speciﬁcations reported in
this section are based on the mixed-effects multilevel estimator, but the inference would be sim-
ilar from an OLS with standard errors clustered at the study level; these robustness checks are
available in Appendix A. The similarity between the outcomes of these two estimators indicates
that the exogeneity assumptions made in the mixed-effects estimation are not seriously violated;
in meta-analysis it is difﬁcult to test exogeneity formally because the extreme unbalancedness
of the data (some studies report only one impulse response) does not permit the construction of a
reasonable ﬁxed-effects model. We prefer mixed effects over OLS because likelihood-ratio tests
reject the hypothesis of zero within-study variance, suggesting that the OLS is misspeciﬁed.
Concerning structural heterogeneity, the results reported in Table 4 suggest that GDP growth,
the openness of the economy, the level and volatility of inﬂation, and the degree of central
bank independence systematically affect the estimated impulse response of prices to monetary
tightening in the medium to long run. The importance of monetary policy shocks weakens in
periods of higher GDP growth. This result is consistent with Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who
argue that asymmetric information and other credit market frictions could amplify the effects of
monetarypolicythroughtheso-calledﬁnancialaccelerator. InperiodsoflowerGDPgrowthand
especially during recessions, ﬁrms’ dependence on external ﬁnancing increases, and changes in
the interest rate become more important.20 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
Table 4: Explaining the Differences in Impulse Responses
Mixed-effects multilevel
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months






(0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.124) (0.150)
1/SE -0.075 -0.125 -0.287 -0.252 -0.154
(0.117) (0.147) (0.181) (0.169) (0.202)
Structural heterogeneity






(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Inﬂation 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.009

(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Inﬂation volatility -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0044









(0.036) (0.048) (0.064) (0.062) (0.070)




(0.039) (0.049) (0.056) (0.048) (0.042)




(0.070) (0.089) (0.097) (0.085) (0.079)
Data characteristics






(0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)




(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Speciﬁcation characteristics





(0.023) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051) (0.092)
Single regime 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.026 0.095












(0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033)






(0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) (0.045)




(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.025) (0.049)







(0.023) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)







(0.162) (0.136) (0.084) (0.070) (0.036)
Other measures -0.072

-0.036 -0.059 -0.041 -0.026








































(0.036) (0.051) (0.069) (0.083) (0.141)
Publication characteristics
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Table 4: Explaining the Differences in Impulse Responses (continued)
Mixed-effects multilevel
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months







(0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.045)
Within-study correlation 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.43
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of the estimate of the percentage
response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate. All explanatory variables are divided by the






denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The expectation channel of monetary transmission can explain why the impact of monetary
policy diminishes in periods of higher inﬂation: high inﬂation impedes the credibility of the
central bank and restricts its ability to control the price level. Furthermore, our results indicate
that a higher volatility of inﬂation strengthens the effect on prices in the long run. This is likely
to be a consequence of monetary policy shocks having more lasting effects in more volatile
environments (Mohanty and Turner, 2008). Next, monetary policy is more effective in open
economies, where its impact can be ampliﬁed through the exchange rate channel. Following
a contractionary monetary policy shock, the real exchange rate appreciates through the uncov-
ered interest parity condition. As a result, imported goods become less expensive, amplifying
the drop in the aggregate price level caused by monetary tightening (Dennis et al., 2007). As
expected, due to improved credibility, monetary policy is more powerful if the central bank
enjoys more independence, which corresponds with the ﬁndings of Rogoff (1985), Keefer and
Stasavage (2003), and Perino (2010).
In contrast, the structural variables (that is, those related to fundamentals) are not so signiﬁcant
for the short-run response, with the exception of the ﬁnancial development indicator. Our re-
sults suggest that higher development of the ﬁnancial system weakens the short-run impact of
monetary policy. This ﬁnding complies with Cecchetti (1999), who reports that the effects of
monetary policy are more important in countries with many small banks, less healthy banking
systems, and underdeveloped capital markets.
Concerning data characteristics, the results presented in Table 4 indicate that the number of
observations systematically inﬂuences the estimated long-run effect: more data make the re-
ported response of prices weaker. In line with Boivin and Giannoni (2006), who put forward
that globalization coupled with ﬁnancial innovations may dampen the effects of monetary pol-
icy shocks on the economy, the reported long-run response weakens when newer data are used.
Speciﬁcation characteristics are found to be important as well. The GDP deﬂator reacts less to
monetary tightening than does the consumer price index. The inclusion of commodity prices
is important for all horizons and ampliﬁes the estimated decrease in prices. When industrial
production is used instead of GDP as a measure of economic activity, the reported response is
typically weaker; on the other hand, the reported response strengthens when the output gap is
used.22 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
Estimation methods are important especially for the short-run response. For the 3- and 6-month
horizons, Bayesian estimation produces a smaller decrease in prices compared with the simple
VAR. The use of FAVAR, non-recursive identiﬁcation, and sign restrictions contributes to re-
porting more potent monetary policy. It is worth noting that all methodological explanations of
the price puzzle that were discussed in Section 3 indeed contribute to alleviating the puzzle and
therefore to estimating intuitive impulse responses (with the exception of the effect of a single
regime of monetary policy, which has the opposite sign, but is statistically insigniﬁcant).
Our results suggest that authors afﬁliated with central banks report less powerful monetary
policy (that is, are more likely to report the price puzzle). This seems counterintuitive since it
might be expected that central bankers have a vested interest in presenting a well-functioning
monetary transmission mechanism. On the other hand, central bank employees may engage
less in publication selection—they produce papers needed by their employers and often submit
them to academic journals only as a by-product.
The multivariate meta-regression corroborates the evidence for publication selection reported in
Section 4. The intercept, a measure of publication bias, is statistically signiﬁcant for the 12-, 18-
, and 36-month horizons. The estimate of the true effect in the multivariate model, however, is
notsimplyrepresentedbytheregressioncoefﬁcientfor1=SE, butisconditionalonthevariables
capturing heterogeneity. In order to estimate the true effect we need to choose the preferred
values of the explanatory variables, thus deﬁning some sort of best practice; in this way we
create a synthetic study with ideal parameters. A suitably deﬁned best-practice estimation can
ﬁlter out misspeciﬁcation bias from the literature, although the approach is subjective since
different researchers may have different opinions on what constitutes best practice.
We deﬁne best practice by selecting methodology characteristics based on the discussion in
Section 3: we prefer the output gap over GDP as a measure of economic activity, non-recursive
identiﬁcation over the simple VAR, data covering a single monetary policy regime over mixing
more regimes, and the inclusion of commodity prices and foreign variables instead of omitting
them. In addition, we prefer Bayesian estimation since overparameterization can be a problem
even for systems of modest size (Banbura et al., 2010). We insert sample maximums for the
number of observations, the year of the data, and the number of endogenous variables.
Table 5: Consequences of Misspeciﬁcations
Linear combination of regressors’ values
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months





Without output gap 0.092 -0.028 -0.006 -0.024 -0.131
Without gap and SVAR 0.160

0.082 0.117 0.115 -0.061









Note: The values represent the percentage response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate.
Without output gap = Best practice omitting output gap. Without gap and SVAR = Best practice omitting output gap and using recursive







denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The variables explaining structural heterogeneity and the dummy variables for central bankers
andpolicymakersaresettotheirsamplemeans. Theestimatedimpulseresponseimpliedbybest
practice is depicted in the bottom part of Figure 6: after controlling for both publication andHow to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 23
misspeciﬁcation biases, the price puzzle is not present and prices bottom out six months after
a one-percentage-point hike in the interest rate (the decrease in prices is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level). The absence of the price puzzle is robust both individually and cumulatively
to other possible deﬁnitions of best practice: selecting the FAVAR approach instead of the
Bayesian approach, selecting the speciﬁcation using sign restrictions instead of non-recursive
identiﬁcation, or selecting the sample mean of the number of endogenous variables in the VAR
system instead of the sample maximum. The price puzzle does not occur even if we set the level
of ﬁnancial development to the sample maximum.
To illustrate the consequences of misspeciﬁcations for the reported impulse responses, Table 5
and Figure 6 investigate the cases where some aspects of methodology deviate from best prac-
tice. When the model does not control for the potential output of the economy, the price puzzle
occurs, but prices decline in the medium and long run. When the model combines the omission
of the output gap with the use of recursive identiﬁcation, the puzzle gets stronger, becomes sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, and prices decline below the initial level only after 18 months. When the
model omits a measure of commodity prices, the price level is reported never to decline below
the initial level during the 3-year horizon after monetary tightening. In sum, our analysis of
the VAR studies on monetary transmission indicates that the price puzzle arises largely from
misspeciﬁcations of the estimated model.
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Finally, using the values of country-speciﬁc characteristics for the Czech Republic, we com-
pute the implied impulse response function of the Czech price level to the monetary policy of
the Czech National Bank. The implied response is depicted in Figure 7 and suggests that a one-
percentage-point increase in the interest rate is likely to decrease prices with a maximum effect
of 0.34% occurring already after six months. The decrease in prices is relatively persistent—the
effect dies out after two years. Although such quick transmission of monetary policy shocks
may seem surprising, our results are in line with the recent published studies on monetary trans-
mission in the Czech Republic (Borys et al., 2009; Elbourne and de Haan, 2009), which also
report in their preferred estimates (that is, those closer to best practice) that the maximum effect
of monetary policy shocks occurs within a year. It is remarkable that the impulse responses re-24 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
ported in these studies are so similar to the impulse response implied by a broad meta-analysis
of the VAR literature. This suggests that the shape of the impulse response is robust.
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Note: Confidence bands are constructed as +/- one standard error.
6. Conclusion
We examine the impact of monetary policy shocks on the price level by quantitatively reviewing
the impulse-response functions from previously published VAR studies on monetary transmis-
sion. We collect impulse response estimates for 31 countries produced by 103 researchers and
regress the estimates on variables capturing study design and author and country characteristics.
To account for within-study dependence in the estimates, we employ mixed-effects multilevel
meta-regression. Recentlydevelopedmeta-analysismethodsallowustoestimatetheunderlying
effect of monetary policy implied by the entire literature net of the bias caused by publication
selection and the misspeciﬁcations of some VAR models in primary studies.
Our results indicate that the estimates reporting more powerful monetary policy (that is, a
greater decrease in the price level following monetary tightening) tend to be preferentially se-
lected for publication. The longer the horizon after a tightening, the stronger the selection. In
the short run, some theory competition exists for the direction of the response since the counter-
intuitive increase in prices can be explained by the cost channel. In contrast, no widely accepted
theory can explain why prices should stay above the initial level in the long run. This relation
between publication selection and theory competition corroborates the ﬁndings of Doucoulia-
gos and Stanley (2008), who report a similar phenomenon for many other areas of empirical
research. The VAR literature on monetary transmission, on average, seems to exaggerate the
long-run response of prices to monetary policy shocks.
The responses are systematically affected by study design and country-speciﬁc structural char-
acteristics. Study design is important in particular for the short run. The reported short-run
increase in prices after a tightening is well explained by the effects of commonly questioned
aspects of methodology, such as the omission of commodity prices, the omission of potential
output, or the use of recursive identiﬁcation. When these are ﬁltered out, the impulse-responseHow to Solve the Price Puzzle? A Meta-Analysis 25
function inferred from the entire literature becomes hump-shaped with no evidence of the price
puzzle. The maximum decrease in the price level following a one-percentage-point increase in
the interest rate reaches 0.33% and already occurs half a year after the tightening.
The long-run response depends on the characteristics of the examined country; on average, the
decrease in prices is relatively persistent. The effect of monetary policy is weaker in countries
with higher average inﬂation, possibly because high inﬂation hampers the credibility of the cen-
tral bank. The effect is stronger in more open economies, in countries with a more independent
central bank, and during recessions.
The robustness of our results could be further examined by adding all unpublished studies to the
datasample; thiswouldrequirecollectinginformationfromhundredsofadditionalmanuscripts,
but would enable the researcher, for instance, to focus exclusively on one selected country.
Researchersmayconductameta-analysisoftheeffectofmonetarypolicyontherateofinﬂation
(in this paper we include only studies using the price level for compatibility). In addition, the
presented method of quantitative synthesis for graphical results can be applied to any other ﬁeld
that uses VARs as a research tool.26 Marek Rusn´ ak, Tom´ aˇ s Havr´ anek and Roman Horv´ ath
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks
Table A1: Test of Publication Bias and True Effect, OLS
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months















(0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
R2 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the study level, in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of the estimate of the






denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table A2: Explaining the Differences in Impulse Responses, OLS
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months






(0.151) (0.133) (0.128) (0.120) (0.130)
1/SE -0.058 -0.106 -0.237 -0.168 -0.028








(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)




(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)










(0.030) (0.054) (0.076) (0.073) (0.067)






(0.031) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.117)




(0.068) (0.106) (0.133) (0.123) (0.061)
Data characteristics










(0.011) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.047)




(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Speciﬁcation characteristics






(0.013) (0.021) (0.039) (0.046) (0.060)
Single regime 0.038

0.034 0.024 0.021 0.109












(0.008) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.059)







(0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.038) (0.055)
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Table A2: Explaining the Differences in Impulse Responses, OLS (continued)
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months










(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.038)
















































































(0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
R2 0.59 0.58 0.48 0.47 0.45
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the study level, in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of
the estimate of the percentage response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate. All explanatory
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